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We develop a theory of managerial replacement in which a venture capitalist monitors
an investee firm run by a manager of unknown quality (Good or Bad). An informative
signal St correlated with performance (value-added) is available to the VC at a cost in
each period t. The problem is when to replace him if he underperforms. We derive a
solution to this problem that takes the form of an optimal cutoff for each period t,
namely, Stþ1, such that, given his track record, the manager will be replaced if and only
if next period’s signal falls below Stþ1. The probability of manager replacement is lower
for managers with good track records, higher incremental values and lower VC discount
rates, and is higher the higher the return to professional replacement, the cost of
investment and the costs of monitoring manager performance. Replacement is also
predicted to enhance company value.
JEL codes: G24, G32
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“Cometh the moment cometh the (wo)man” (Anon)
Academics rarely make good managers of high tech businesses and even when they
do their usefulness to the company is ephemeral, depending very much on the stage of
development the business has reached: for example, a manager useful at startup in
product development may have skills that become redundant when full-scale produc-
tion and marketing is required (Hellmann and Puri 2002; Wright et al. 2005; Wright
and Lockett 2005; Wright et al. 2007). The facts demonstrate that very few first-time entre-
preneurs (owner-managers) last the course from inception to maturity; in the first 7 to
8 years of the business’ life, a high proportion are replaced by professional managers
(with extensive previous management experience) often at the behest of the venture
capitalist or other financier. (Baron et al. 2001; Hellmann 1998; Hellmann and Puri
2002)a. Clearly the replacement decision is an important one both for the entrepreneur
and the VC whose investment is tied up in the company. The VC needs someone who
is good at managing people (optimising individual performance), who is in touch with
the market, the technology and competition (Hellmann and Puri 2002). All these
things will influence the business’ performance and ultimately the VC’s returns.2014 Cressy; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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out from a university science department or other technically-oriented entrepreneurs
with little management experience–see Wright et al. 2005, 2007) their quality as execu-
tives is (at least initially) unknown. The VC will learn about this quality over time as a
result of frequent (or not so frequent) contact with the new company in the form of
monitoring and advice (Cumming and Johan 2007). At some point the manager’s ability
is sufficiently well known for the VC to be able to make a decision about replacement in
favour of a professional manager. This process and its criteria have an inherent eco-
nomic logic as we shall shortly see, but the theoretical literature provides little guidance
on the matter. Hence the current paper.
In this paper we model the VC learning process and the replacement decision in
a Bayesian dynamic programming frameworkb. Briefly, a venture capitalist monitors
a start-up run by a manager of unknown quality over a finite horizon. The prob-
lem is when to replace him should he underperform. The VC knows that his unob-
servable quality as a manager affects the likelihood of an increment to firm value
next period, which will ultimately enhance the VC’s return. The VC can however
observe an informative signal (e.g. ‘people skills’),c St , of the manager’s ability in
period t at cost c. This enables her to update her prior on the manager’s ability
and on the expected profits from retaining him for one more period rather than
replacing him with a professional manager. The latter yields a known present dis-
counted value to the VC of Πm. In each of the periods we derive an optimal cutoff
St for the signal that results in a rule showing when to replace the manager. The
chances of adding to firm value in any period are predicted to be positively related
to past managerial performance (mean value of the signal). The probability of man-
ager replacement is thus lower for managers with good track records (S1). We find
that it is also lower for managers with higher incremental values (π3(γ2)) and is
higher for lower VC discount rates (r). Finally it is higher the higher the return to
professional replacement (Πm ), the cost of investment (I2) and the costs of moni-
toring manager performance (c).Basics
A VC does not know the quality of the manager he employs in his investee company.
However, she has a prior distribution on manager quality and judges that the manager
is of Good or Bad quality with probability p(G) and p(B) = 1–p(G). Only if the manager
is Good is the return to the firm’s project in a period positive. The value of the project
at t, if successful, πt, will in general itself depend on the manager’s track record, con-
sisting of a set of observable past signals, Sτ; τ ¼ 1; 2;…; t−1: Thus we write πt ¼ π
S1;S2;…St−1ð Þ (see Figure 1).
Thus the expected value of the project conditional on the information set to date is
positive if and only if the manager’s quality is Good.The VC learning process
Consider first a discrete quality two-period model. We begin by showing that under the
Monotone Likelihood Property (Milgrom 1981) the posterior probability of the man-
ager incrementing firm value is increasing in his track record defined as his period 1
Figure 1 The payoff function.
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these posterior probabilities and the optimal cutoffs associated with them.
The VC can observe a costly signal of the manager’s quality which is either High (H)
or Low (L). She thus starts off with a prior on the manager’s quality and then updates
this estimate as monitoring occurs. The probability that a manager is Good given a
signal S1 is by Bayes rule:
p GjS1ð Þ ¼ p S1jGð Þp Gð Þ
p S1 GÞp Gð Þ þ p S1 BÞp Bð Þjðjð ð1Þ
where S1∈ H; Lf g. This can be rewritten as
pðGjS1Þ ¼ 1
1þ p S1jBð Þp Bð Þ
p S1 GÞp Gð Þjð
ð2Þ
showing more explicitly the dependence of the posterior on the likelihood ratio
p S1jBð Þp Bð Þ
p S1 GÞp Gð Þjð ð3Þ
We shall without loss of generality assume in what follows that p Bð Þ ¼ p Gð Þ ¼ 1=2
and that the ratio (3) satisfies the following inequalities:
Assumption 1:
p HjBð Þ
p HjGð Þ < 1 <
p LjBð Þ
p L GÞjð ð4Þ
This is equivalent to assuming that the likelihood ratio is increasing in the signal S orthat the distribution function for quality Q conditional on H first order stochastically
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p HjGð Þ ; y≡
p LjBð Þ
p L GÞjð ð5Þ
Using Assumption 1 we can conclude that x < 1; y > 1 and therefore that
p GjLð Þ < 1
2
< p G HÞjð ð6Þ
Thus the probability of success (of the manager being Good) in any period, given thesignal, is increasing in the value of the signal S2 (management performance).
A second observation of the quality signal, S2, results in an updating of the VCs
prior to
p GjS1;S2ð Þ ¼ 1
1þ p S1;S2jBð Þ
p S1;S2 GÞjð
ð7Þ
If observations of the signal are independent this simplifies to
pðGjS1;S2Þ ¼ 1
1þ p S1jBð Þp S2jBð Þ
p S1 GÞp S2 GÞjðjð
ð8Þ
It follows that the four possible posterior probabilities are related as follows:p GjH;Hð Þ ¼ 1= 1þ x2  ð9Þ
p GjH;Lð Þ ¼ p G L;HÞ ¼ 1= 1þ xyð Þjð ð10Þ
p GjL;Lð Þ ¼ 1= 1þ y2  ð11Þ
And, using 5:
p GjH;Hð Þ > p GjL;Hð Þ ¼ p G H;LÞ > p G L; LÞjðjð ð12Þ
Thus a superior ‘track record’ (sequence of signals) of the manager results in a higherBayesian estimate of his chances of producing an increment to firm value next period.
Using 5, 9-11 we have
1= 1þ x2  > 1= 1þ xð Þ > 1= 1þ yð Þ > 1= 1þ y2  ð13Þ
so that the dispersion of conditional probabilities of success (value increment) is pre-
dicted to increase over time (rounds).
The 2-period optimal value function
Consider again the discrete quality two-period model. We begin by showing that under
the Monotone Likelihood Ratio property (henceforth MLR)e and the posterior probabil-
ity of the manager in adding value is increasing in his track record defined as his period
1 signal value, S1. We then develop the optimal value function in terms of these poster-
ior probabilities and the optimal cutoffs associated with them.
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St; t ¼ 1; 2;… in period t, at a cost. A superior ‘track record’ (sequence of past signals)
of the manager results in a higher Bayesian estimate of his chances of incrementing
value (i.e. generating a positive payoff ) next period.
Consider now the value function of the VC in period 2. Figure 2 shows the decision
tree structure. Since we have just two periods, the optimal value function will be zero
in period 3 and thereafter: EV3 ¼ EV4 ¼ … ¼ 0. We can therefore write the period 2
VC value function as
V2ðS2e ;S1; Þ ¼ max−I2ðS2Þe þ δ½p3ðS2;e S1; Þπ3−c;Πm ð14Þ
where
I2ðS2Þe = signal-dependent investment in period 2, I20ðS2Þe ≥ 0.
δ = discount factor (=1/(1 + r), where r = the risk-adjusted interest rate).
p3ðS2 ;S1Þ≡pðGjS2 ;S1Þ = probability manager adds value (is Good) in period 3
given an observed signal about his ability from last period, S1, and the random variable
representing his period 2 signal, S2
e .
π3 = period 3 value increment of the manager under success
f.
c = costs of monitoring managerial performanceg.
Πm =present discounted value (p.d.v.) of the VC’s return from the firm under profes-
sional managementh.
The second period value function V 2 then shows the present discounted value (p.d.
v.) to the VC of either investing and continuing one more period with the existing man-
ager of uncertain quality (yielding p.d.v. −I2ðS2Þe þ δ½p3ðS2;e S1; Þπ3−c) or investing andFigure 2 The VC’s decision tree.
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i. Note that the
continuous signal version of the MLRP guarantees that the first term in the max{.}
expression in Equation 14 is increasing in the first period signal S1, since it implies
∂p3ðS2e ;S1Þ=∂S1 > 0.
The expected value of this function with respect to (w.r.t.) S2 for an arbitrary cutoff
signal S2^ is given by













Choosing the cutoff optimally requires maximising (15) w.r.t. this cutoff and yields




 þ δ p3 S2;S1 π3−c  ¼ Πm ð16Þ
(see Figure 3). The second order condition requires
−I2
0 S2
 þ δ π3∂p3 S2;S1 =∂S2 > 0 ð17Þ
We shall assume henceforth that this condition holdsj. Combining this result with
the second order condition for a maximum Equation 3 shows that the VC will at the
beginning of period 2 choose to keep the manager if and only if the expected value to
the company if he is retained, given his track record (S1), is greater than the value of his
replacement. More precisely we have the replacement rule:
Replace the manager in period 2 if and only if
δ p3 S2;S1ð Þπ3−c½ −I2 S2ð Þ < Πm ð18ÞFigure 3 A better track record in period 1 reduces the chances of replacement in period 2.
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replaced, given his initial performance, if and only if his second period performance
falls below a certain threshold:




Plugging 3 into 2 the optimal period 2 value function now becomesES2V

2ðS2e ;S1Þ ¼ Πm ð20Þ
where ES2V

2ðS2e ;S1Þ≡maxS2ES2V2ðS2e ;S1 S2Þ .
We now let the manager’s incremental value, π3(γ2), be increasing in a market de-
mand parameter γ2. Consider the continuous signal case. Using the MLR property of
























where η is a shift parameter in the function I2 (I2η > 0Þ . Thus we have shown that in
the second period the probability of manager replacement is lower for managers with
good track records(S1), higher incremental values (π3(γ2)) and lower VC discount rates
(r), and that it is higher the higher the return to professional replacement (Πm), the cost
of investment (I2) and the costs of monitoring manager performance (c). Figure 3 illus-
trates the effects of better performance on the likelihood of manager replacement.
We move back now to period one. The period 1 value function is given by
V1ðS1e Þ ¼ max−I1ðS1Þe þ δ½p2ðS1e Þπ2ðS1e Þ−cþ ES2V2ðS1;Se 2Þ;Πm ð24Þ
with expected value





−I1ðS1Þe þ δ½p2 S1ð Þπ2−cþ ES2V2ðS2e ;S1e ÞdF S1ð Þ
ð25Þ
Choosing the period 1 cutoff optimally requires−I1ðS1e Þ þ δ½p2 S1 π2 þ ES2V2ðS2e ;S1Þ ¼ Πm ð26Þ
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
1ðS1e Þ ¼ Πm ð27Þ
It is clear that whilst the optimal value function is a constant the optimal cutoffs will
vary with the information available at the time. The comparative statics of the first
period cutoff with respect to the relevant parameters, assuming symmetrically that
π2 = π2(γ1) is increasing in the demand parameter, γ1, show that, as might be expected,
the first period probability of manager replacement is lower for managers with good
track records(S1), higher incremental values (π3(γ2)) and lower VC discount rates (r); it
is higher the higher the return to professional replacement (Πm), the cost of investment
(I2) and the costs of monitoring manager performance (c)
k.
The T-period model
The generalisation of the model to T periods is straightforward and we present most of
the results rather than proving them in the text. The obvious way to represent the
manager’s track record in the multiperiod context is by the mean of the signals over
the periods up to the present (t). For some distribution functions (e.g. the Normal) the
mean of the signal history and the number of periods before the present, t-1, will be a
sufficient statistic for the signal historyl. Restricting ourselves to such distributions we
can write the tth period value function as





Si=t is the mean signal from the manager up to time t
m.


















































t ¼ t−1 St þ t−1ð ÞSt−1
  ð31Þ
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We developed a theory of managerial replacement in which a venture capitalist moni-
tored an investee firm run by a manager of unknown quality (Good or Bad). An in-
formative signal St correlated with performance (value-added) was available to the VC
at a cost in each period t. The problem was when to replace him if he underperformed.
We derived a solution to this problem that took the form of an optimal cutoff for each
period t, namely, Stþ1, such that, given his track record, the manager would be replaced
if and only if next period’s signal fell below Stþ1 . We showed that the probability of
manager replacement was lower for managers with good track records, higher incre-
mental values and lower VC discount rates, and was higher the higher the return to
professional replacement, the cost of investment and the costs of monitoring manager
performance. Replacement was also predicted to enhance company value.
Endnotes
aHellmann, reports statistics from Hannan et al. (1996) who found that in Silicon Valley
high tech startups 20% of owner-managers were replaced in the first 10 months of the
business’ life, rising to 80% in the first 80 months. These figures we shall see later are
broadly consistent with those in the current dataset.
bThere is a parallel here with the model of entrepreneurship as a learning experiment
in Jovanovic (1982). Jovanovic argues that an entrepreneur learns about his ability in
entrepreneurship only by starting a business. His initial prior is updated by successive
feedback from the market on his costs of operation. Our model is consistent with this
view of the entrepreneur, but we look at it from the VCs perspective, so that the VC
learns about the entrepreneur’s ability by investing in him or her and observing her
performance. In Jovanovic the entrepreneur decides if and when to quit based on her
updated information on her skills; in our model the VC makes the decision for her.
cA great manager has the ability to bring out the very best in people thus optimising
their ability. This is modelled in the paper by assuming that the probability of success
in any period increases in the value of the signal.
dVery briefly Milgrom shows that under the Monotone Likelihood Property (hence-
forth MLRP) given in our case by inequalities 4, that any risk averter (in our case the
VC) will strictly prefer the posterior distribution manager quality Q (in our case B, G)
conditional on the signal H over the same distribution conditional on L.
eSee Milgrom (1981).
fWe shall henceforth, without loss of generality, drop the dependence of π on the sig-
nals St.
gWe assume c < p3ðS2;e S1; Þπ3 with probability 1.
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needs to take place on the part of the VC about the parameters).
iNote that we are modelling only stages at which investment by the VC occurs. There
is always in practice the possibility that the VC will not invest at all at a given stage.
However, our data (as most other data) records only stages at which investment oc-
curred. Hence our tests will be on ‘superior’ businesses in this sense. Our modelling ef-
fectively assumes therefore that the value function in 1 is positive with probability 1. It
is very straightforward to adjust the model to take into account the possibility of no in-
vestment at a given stage.
jIt is automatically satisfied, given the MLRP, if I
0
2 ¼ 0.
kNote that because of the absence of observations on the managerial signal in period
1 (this is not visible until period 2) we cannot examine the impact of track record at
this stage.
lWe can assume that the signals H and L assume the values 1 and 0 respectively. This
gives us as the mean value the proportion of past periods in which the manager per-
formed well.
mBear in mind here that this mean contains now the random variable Set of period t.
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